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A SOFTER FORMALISM
Peter L. Strauss*
As our colleagues have often remarked, Professor John Manning's
and my views have moved much closer to each other since I wrote the
piece he graciously uses as the stalking horse for unmitigated func-
tionalism,' and he more recently established himself as the scholarly
spokesperson for Scalian textualism and formalism.2
I greatly admire the moderate and exquisitely informed voice of
Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation,3 which deserves the
important influence it will doubtless have. The brief thoughts that fol-
low are to suggest only that (as scholars often enough do) he somewhat
exaggerates the characteristics of the schools that he presents as the
poles of his persuasive middle ground (functionalism especially); and
that, a little strangely, he does not go as far as he might in observing
the influence that the details of the Constitution's text respecting gov-
ernment structures might have on the interpretation, especially, of the
President's Article II authority.
I. FUNCTIONALISM MUST BE INFORMED BY TEXT,
TEXTUALISM, BY FUNCTION
No functionalist scholar - certainly not this one - treats the Ne-
cessary and Proper Clause as "giv[ing] Congress virtually limitless
room to innovate as long as the overall balance of power is main-
tained."4 The oversimplified view of functionalism is to present it as
indifferent to text, an issue that in my judgment is also present in a
certain exaggeration of its relative, purposivism. There is no bright
dividing line between an era of purposive/functionalist interpretations
and textualist/formalist ones. One of the striking facts about the Su-
preme Court's decisions in Bowsher v. Synarj his example of majori-
tarian formalism, and Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Betts Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
1 Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
2 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
673 (1997); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV 685 (1999).
John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV L. REV
1939 (201I).
4 Id. at 1987.
5 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
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Schor,6 his example of majoritarian functionalism, is that the two
opinions were read in Court on July 7, 1986 - the same and final day
of the 1985 Term. Four Justices joined both opinions.'
One looking carefully at the dates of the opinions he quotes and
cites to contrast asserted eras of purposivism and textualism will find
that they, too, overlap. With rare exceptions, driven by social impera-
tives perhaps deserving to be resisted, purposivists apply their skills to
and within the boundaries of text. That they find themselves freer of
dictionaries, and more attentive to evidence of the concrete social is-
sues catalyzing legislative action, than textualists often are, does not
obliterate the constraints of text. One must still determine what the
statutory text could mean, deploying traditional tools of statutory in-
terpretation, before attending to what it does mean.
Neither the formalist majority in INS v. Chadha nor Justice
White's functionalist dissent is satisfactory. The majority opinion is
circular; only by asserting that Chadha had already acquired a legal
right not to be deported could it reason that the House legislative veto
altered his rights. But the statute, of course, gave him no fixed right
not to be deported until House and Senate, by their inaction, had per-
mitted the legislatively reserved contingency to mature. Justice Pow-
ell's lonely concurrence, in my judgment, was more to the point. Just
as it would have offended our sense of fairness, and of statutory
placement in the Attorney General of the right to suspend deportation,
to have the President telephone the Attorney General demanding his
action against Chadha in this particular case, it is equally offensive for
the House to seek to force that issue in an adjudication. Justice
White's purported demonstration that the process for suspending de-
portation merely echoed the private bill dispensations it had been de-
veloped to supplant - as had been the case for private bills, President,
House, and Senate must each agree to suspend deportation - failed to
take account of the then-quite-recent spread of legislative vetoes to
regulatory actions. The President certainly may not "veto" rules
promulgated by independent regulatory commissions; and indeed,
whether he may command the precise outcomes even of EPA or DOT
rulemakings is doubtful.9
If, then, one or both houses of Congress claim a veto over regulato-
ry decisions, they have asserted an influence denied the President;
however persuasive they might be in the context of reorganizations,
6 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
7 See Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation of Powers
Questions - A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV 488 (1987).
8 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
9 See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer or "The Decider"? The President in Administrative Law, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV 696 (2007).
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budget adjustments, or even deportations, in the regulatory context
Justice White's parallels are not present. 10 And with the legislative ve-
to, if sustained, Congress will have, not irrelevantly if one is concerned
with the problems of legislative precision and delegation, given itself
permission to legislate mush.1'
For Schor, too, both formalist and functionalist critiques stumble.
In permitting the joinder of administrative action to collect fines with
state law counterclaim for damages, the majority was doing only what
the Court - Justice Brennan writing in, I suppose, a functionalist
vein - had earlier permitted federal district courts; United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs' 2 approved their supplemental (pendant?) jurisdiction
over state claims otherwise beyond their jurisdiction to reach, in the
interest of party and tribunal convenience. Where the insoluble and
unnoticed problem in the case lay was in its easy assumption that
Congress could authorize a private individual to invoke the jurisdic-
tion of an administrative agency in an action to collect money damages
from another private person for his violation of (regulatory) law. Cro-
well v. Benson,'3 the last comprehensible Supreme Court opinion to
address this kind of problem, rationalized such delegations as either
analogous to special masters, within the judiciary, or as occurring in
settings in which Congress need provide no resort at all to the courts
(cases of "public right"). With its full panoply of regulatory authorities,
the CFTC cannot possibly be thought an adjunct to the judicial
branch; and today, if not in Crowell's time, it is reasonably clear that
due process considerations would not permit Congress to empower the
CFTC to amerce and collect fines for private persons (or even for it-
self) free of judicial supervision. As Justice White remarked in another
of the Article III cases, "what limits Art. III places on Congress's abili-
ty to create adjudicative institutions designed to carry out federal
policy established pursuant to the substantive authority given Con-
gress elsewhere in the Constitution . . . at this point in the history of
constitutional law . . . can no longer be answered by looking only to
the constitutional text."14 His dissent had the concurrence of Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Powell, neither of whom were habitual
functionalists.
In Bowsher as in Chadha, in my judgment, one can gain a good
deal more by looking to the concurrence than to either "formalist" ma-
10 See Peter L. Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comennt on the Supreme
Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789.
11 Cf Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997)..
12 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
13 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
14 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 94 (1982) (White, J.,
dissenting).
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jority or "functionalist" dissent. As Justice Stevens argued, the GAO is
in reality a congressional, not an executive, agency. Without regard to
the fact of nominal presidential appointment of its Comptroller, all its
effective oversight relationships are with the Congress. And it was ex-
ecuting the law, in stark contravention of Article II's vesting of execu-
tive authority in the President. The details of removal authority had
little to do with the realities of the case.
A similar issue may be making its way to the Court today, in chal-
lenges to the Copyright Royalty Tribunal's authority to allocate digital
copyright fees. It is a subordinate agency of the Library of Congress
(emphasis supplied), and the formality that the Librarian of Congress
is very occasionally nominated by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate seems little more than a figleaf to cover congres-
sional misappropriation of executive function.15
II. APPLYING PROFESSOR MANNING'S APPROACH TO
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY OVER DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT
This short essay turns now to the influence of details. Professor
Manning is completely persuasive in the few lines that introduce his
discussion of "Reading the Constitution's Structural Articles":
In the absence of any meaningful separation of powers baseline, inter-
preters must take seriously the particular compromises reflected in the
adopted text, including the diverse levels of generality at which the docu-
ment expresses its structural policies. When the Constitution adopts a
specific rule about how to implement a given power, interpreters should
read that provision as creating a hard and fast limit on congressional au-
thority to adopt a contrary arrangement. In such a case, where the com-
promise reflects precise decisions about what institution is to exercise a
power and the appropriate procedures for its doing so, the interpreter's
job is to protect the balance struck. This conclusion raises questions
about important aspects of functionalism.
Conversely, when the Constitution adopts provisions that speak in
large, round, indefinite terms, the Court should not read them as if they
reflect clear rules. 16
One need not agree with all the details of his analysis - for me, for
example, the key to understanding the "Decision of 1789" and Myers v.
United States" is that the former decision was only that the Senate
would have no voice in removals, and the latter decision was only that
constitutionally the Senate could have no such voice. All the rest of
Myers - that is, our former President's paean to necessary executive
1s See SoundExchange, Inc. v. Librarian of Congress, 571 F3 d 1220, 1226 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
16 Manning, supra note 3, at 2005.
17 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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authority - is surplusage. But Professor Manning's basic proposition
is a commanding one, and the remaining paragraphs of this short
commentary will turn to an example that borders on but is strikingly
untouched by his discussion, and that bears directly on the issues of
presidential authority to which he gives such thoughtful attention.
Here are the important indicators of compromise in the constitu-
tional text that Professor Manning does not take the occasion to dis-
cuss. This language, a vivid example of the ways in which the "docu-
ment that defines the governmental structure [does so] in painstaking
detail," is in italics:
Art. I, § 8, cl. 18: to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution" in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Officer thereof.
Art. II, § 2, Cl. i: The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States,
when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require
the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive
Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective
Qffices ....
Art II, § 3: . . . he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed ....
In contrast to the Vesting Clause, one of those "provisions that
speak in large, round, indefinite terms, [that] the Court should not
read . . . as if they reflect clear rules,"2 0 these three clauses, taken to-
gether, consistently envision a government in which subordinate offic-
ers in the civilian government may themselves be vested with duties,
in relation to which the President's responsibility is that of an overseer,
rather than a decisionmaker. Particularly striking - the kind of detail
Professor Manning evokes, although it is not one he discusses - is the
contrast between the first and second clauses of Article II, Section 2.
With respect to the military, the President is "Commander in Chief";
but regarding domestic government, the only words about his relation-
ship to it other than the appointments clause, is that he may demand
of responsible officials their opinions about their duties. The sugges-
tion that duties will be vested in others than the President, inherent in
18 Manning, supra note 3, at 1984.
19 The Constitution, leaving the creation of the government of the United States to Congress,
itself vests no powers either in Congress or in any department or officer. The wording appears to
be the somewhat careless residue of an earlier draft that did create a government of several de-
partments given specific duties (the Army, for example) and headed by principal officers responsi-
ble for their administration. See Strauss, supra note i, at 599-602. Rather than treat it as sur-
plusage, it seems sensible to take it as a reference to the departments and officers as they are, the
product of congressional creation.
20 Manning, supra note 3, at 2005.
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the Necessary and Proper Clause, is repeated here. The contrast be-
tween being commander and being the requester of views, the one
clause following immediately upon the other, is striking. And the pas-
sive voice of the Take Care Clause, hidden between his (not that im-
portant) responsibilities to receive ambassadors and to commission of-
ficers, confirms that the President is not the one whose direct action is
contemplated. Treating "separation of powers" analysis as an occasion
for "ordinary interpretation," and respecting the meaning of
straightforward text as Professor Manning so forcefully counsels us to
do, one readily finds here a striking example of "the diverse levels of
generality at which the document expresses its structural policies.
When the Constitution adopts a specific rule about which institution is
to exercise a certain power and in what way, interpreters should read
that provision as "creating a hard and fast limit on" 21 not only con-
gressional power, but also presidential authority to adopt a contrary
arrangement.
One setting in which this issue has great importance is regulatory
rulemaking. When Chadha was decided, serious White House over-
sight of rulemaking authority was at an early stage of its development.
Although President Reagan's Executive Order 12,29122 predated it by
two years, contemporary analyses treated rulemaking as an agency ac-
tivity, one that might be influenced by "undisclosed Presidential prod-
ding";23 and the language of the order itself carefully avoided asserting
any right of presidential decision on the merits. Rulemaking records,
at the time, were physical records in agency hands; the President's
small Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs could not expect to
have ready access to them. The newly created Senior Executive Ser-
vice, that transformed management levels of the Civil Service, had not
yet suffered from its vulnerability to political capture. Today, that
vulnerability has been exploited;24 the Executive Order regimes have
consistently been strengthened by subsequent Presidents25 and OIRA
enlarged; and, of particular importance to the reality of White House
possible control, the development of a computerized Federal Data
Management Service in conjunction with electronic rulemaking puts
rulemaking records on White House as well as agency desks. Under-
21 Id.
22 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981).
23 Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Note that about go% of this opin-
ion's text concerned itself with excruciatingly detailed review of the agency's reasoning in light of
the agency's data.
24 David Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of Agen-
cy Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV 1095 (2008).
25 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993).
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standing, then, where authority and duties constitutionally lie has
much heightened practical importance.
The understanding I suggest is supported by the requirement that
principal officers (and any inferior officer Congress does not permit to
be appointed by other means) must be appointed with the advice and
consent of the Senate. This is no idle requirement. It has a political
thrust that reinforces the suggested reading. These appointees will
have to be satisfactory to others than the President. Should they be
removed from office, whether for cause or at will, the President will
have to secure the Senate's approval of their replacement. And, as in
the case of William Ruckleshaus supplanting Anne Gorsuch as Ronald
Reagan's administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the
President's practical freedom to appoint whom he wishes and to fire
him for any deviation from White House policy preferences may be
sharply limited. Surely Mr. Ruckleshaus was aware, from the distance
between his views on environmentalism and Ms. Gorsuch's, that his
appointment was significantly a product of congressional wishes for
environmental administration; and by the same token he could be con-
fident that on the duties entrusted to him by legislation, he had sub-
stantial room for decision without fear of presidential dismissal. He
was in a political relationship with the Senate, as designed by the Con-
stitution, that would constrain the exercise of removal authority, in
practice, by knowledge of its possible political costs and the necessity
of finding a Senate-acceptable replacement. The Framers well under-
stood the hazards that would lie in permitting a President alone to
make appointments; to them, it was "the most insidious and powerful
weapon of eighteenth century despotism." 26 Congress is in a position
to prevent the appointment of a herd of simple yes-men, in general; as
to principal officers, the Constitution directly forbids it to facilitate
such appointments, by requiring that its voice, too, must be heard.
Attention to these details, along precisely the lines he so persuasive-
ly urges, might have permitted Professor Manning a somewhat less ag-
nostic view of presidential authority than he seems to profess. But
then, as he counseled, he was building a framework, not purporting to
hang on it every conclusion it might support. And that framework is a
persuasive one, indeed.
26 Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 883 (1991) (quoting GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776 -1787, at 143 (1969)).
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